Proposals

Curators identified several structural concerns during review. The proposal describes proof of presence (event attendance) but does not clearly bridge to proof of personhood or define a mechanism for enforcing uniqueness (one human, one identity). The Sybil resistance model relies on participation friction rather than formal guarantees and scales poorly as adoption increases. Attendance credentials are publicly linkable with no privacy enhancements proposed, creating social graph leakage risk. The organizer and co-signer trust model, attendance integrity, and budget breakdown required further specification. Questions were sent to the proposer; the proposal was subsequently withdrawn.

Curators acknowledged the team's responsiveness and iterative improvements during the review process. However, several fundamental design concerns remain. The proposal centers on device-based identity (one-device-one-vote) rather than person-based identity (one-person-one-vote), which does not align with the objectives of the bounty. The Sybil resistance model is insufficient, as the system can be easily circumvented through the purchase or rental of multiple devices. Additionally, the approach relies on device manufacturer attestation without clearly articulating the underlying trust assumptions or their implications.